32

Tesuji Okazaki
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the Japanese coal industry and the government coal policy during World War II. In Section 3, I analyze labour productivity at the district-level. Section 4 describes the mine dynamics and investigates the implications for labour productivity change. Section 5 concludes the paper. Figure 1 depicts the indices of production and labour productivity in the Japanese coal industry from the early 1930s to the end of the war, with 1930 as the benchmark year. Labour productivity is measured by production per worker. We can identify some phases in this figure. Coal production increased from the early 1930s until 1940, when it reached a plateau. It was maintained at this high level until 1944, in the final stage of the war. Then, in 1945, it declined sharply. Labour productivity behaved rather differently from production; it reached its peak as early as 1933, and then continued to decline until 1945. An important regime change took place in the general economic system around the middle of the phase of increasing coal production. The starting point of the regime change was the acceleration of inflation and the sharp increase in imports from the end of 1936, caused by the announcement of the huge expansion of the military budget. To restrict imports, the government imposed direct control on use of foreign exchange. In addition to the short-term increase in the military budget, the army drew up a long-term expansion plan for munitions industries including coal, steel and machine tools (Five Year Plan for Important Industries, Juyo Sangyo Gokanen Keikaku), and requested that the government implement it in May 1937, just before the Sino-Japanese War.
Overview of the coal industry during World War II
When full-scale war with China began in July 1937, the Japanese government expanded its economic controls to mobilize resources for the war. In 1938, the government drew up a plan for allocating strategic commodities including coal and steel (Material Mobilization Plan, Busshi Doin Keikaku) , and imposed controls on production and distribution of those commodities to implement the plan. At the same time, price controls were also introduced. That is, in August 1938, the Commodity Price Control Rule (Buppin Hanbai Kakaku Torihismari Kisoku) was enacted to give the government the authority to enforce an upper-bound price for each commodity. As a long-term plan for expanding munitions industries, the Four Year Plan for Production Capacity Expansion (Seisanryoku Kakuju Keikaku), was set by the Cabinet in January 1939. Thus, the basic system of planning and control was established by 1939. Japan at a price covering the production cost of each mine, which was pooled to be sold at the official price. 6 Subsequently, differences between the average purchasing price (price for producer) and selling price (price for consumer) of Nihon Coal Co. widened, thus giving coal mines incentives to increase production while simultaneously curbing inflation (Figure 2 ). 1940 was a turning point, not only for the whole Japanese war economy, but also for the coal industry. In September 1940, the diplomatic conflict with the U.S. reached its decisive point because of Japan's invasion of northern Indochina and its military alliance with Germany and Italy. The U.S. responded by placing an embargo on steel scrap trade with Japan, which had a serious impact on Japan's munitions production. In order to cope with this change and prepare for the war with the U.S. expected in the near future, the Japanese government tried to strengthen the system of war economy. One of the key reform measures was to establish powerful industrial associations (control association, toseikai) in strategic industries, including coal and steel. In principle, each control association would organize all the companies in the industry, and the president of the association was granted wide-ranging authority to command member companies, under the Major Industrial Association Directive (Juyo Sangyo Dantai Rei). (Pacific War) broke out. Mobilization of resources for the war restricted the supply of materials, particularly steel, to the coal industry. Consequently, steel-labour ratio in the coal industry declined sharply from 1940 ( Figure 3 ). As steel was one of the essential inputs for the coal industry to build and sustain galleries of mines, decline of steel supply made a serious impact on the coal mining industry as we will see below.
Under these conditions, the government and the Coal Control Association adopted a policy of concentrating resources and production on efficient mines. As a result, inefficient mines were closed and workers were moved to more efficient mines. This selective policy was continued until the final stages of the war, 8 and made a substantial impact on the market structure.
Productivity change and its sources: District-level analysis
To investigate the implication of these policies for productivity, we first look at district-level data. (Mining Yearbook of Japan) , edited by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, contains production and input data for the jurisdiction of each mine supervision bureau. Here, we refer to these data as district-level data, for simplicity. Table 2 summarizes the data for four points in time : 1930, 1935, 1939 and 1944 . As shown, more than 90 percent of coal was produced in two districts, Sapporo (Hokkaido) and Fukuoka (Kyushu). Of these two districts, production in Kyushu was much larger, but its share declined during the war. Indeed, coal mines in Kyushu were aging, whereas those in Hokkaido were newly developed. Labour productivity varied substantially across districts, and was substantially higher in Hokkaido than elsewhere. Here, labour productivity is measured by production per worker as in Figure 1 . Finally, over time changes in labour productivity were similar across districts: generally it rose from 1930 to 1935, and then declined.
It is possible to analyze cross-sectional and time series variation in labour productivity by regression analysis. To do that, we assume the following standard Cobb-Douglas type production function. Besides labour, we include three inputs, namely steel, electricity and explosives. Steel was mainly used to build and sustain galleries, a part of the basic capital stock of the coal mines. Electricity is a proxy for the service of machinery, because most of motors at coal mines were driven by electrical power.
10 Explosives were an intermediary input to dig coal beds. 
Taking the log and adding district dummies (κ i ) and year dummies(λ t ) as well as the error term (ε it ), we have
The term of ln(L it ） captures the scale effect. In case its coefficient is positive, zero and negative, the production function is increasing, constant and decreasing return to scale, respectively. The sum of district dummies (κ i ), year dummies (λ t ) and error term (ε it ) is a measure of the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), where district dummies and year dummies represent its district-specific and year-specific components, respectively. Using the annual data from 1930 to 1944, we estimate equation (3). The observations are 75 district-years (5 districts * 15 years). The basic statistics and the estimation result are reported in Table 3 and Table 4 . Some interesting findings emerge. Concerning the district-specific component of TFP, with Hokkaido as the reference, all of the district dummies except Kyushu are negative and statistically significant. The Kyushu dummy is positive but statistically insignificant. Also remarkable is the fairly large magnitude. For example, the difference in the district-specific component of TFP between Hokkaido and Sendai was 1.29 times larger than the standard deviation of labour productivity, 0.599 (Table 3 ). This implies that the two centers of coal mining in Japan, Hokkaido and Kyushu had substantially higher TFP than the other districts, other conditions being equal. Meanwhile, no temporal trend is observed in the year-specific component of TFP. On the other hand, the coefficient of ln(L it ) is significantly negative and the magnitude is large, which means the production function (1) has a property of diminishing return to scale. As we control for district-specific shocks, the scale effect here reflects intertemporal variation of scale in each district. Given that, diminishing return at the district-level suggests that good coal beds were limited in each district and rapid expansion of coal production in a district led to deterioration of coal beds there. Also, it is possible that expansion of production was accompanied by deterioration of labour force. I will discuss this issue in the next section. Based on the estimates in Table 4 , we can decompose the labour productivity change into contributions of input-labour ratios and TFP using the following formula.
Where ∆ denotes the operator to take difference, and w it denotes the weight of district i in year t in terms of number of workers. Table 5 decomposes the average labour productivity using the above formula. Before the war (1930-35), there were three major sources of labour productivity improvement, namely increase in the input-labour ratio, positive scale effect and TFP growth; the start of the war affected all of these sources. During 1935-39, the contribution of input-labour ratio fell to zero, and contribution of scale effect and TFP declined substantially to become negative. In the late stage of the war, 1939-44, the contribution of the input-labour ratio, particularly the contribution of steel-labour ratio, became negative. This reflects the restriction of steel supply, as discussed in the previous section. On the other hand, it is remarkable that the magnitude of the negative impact of scale effect decreased, and furthermore contribution of TFP became positive under the deteriorating conditions in the coal industry. In the next section, I analyze mine-level data to explore the cause of large TFP decline in the early stage of the war and efforts to mitigate it in the late stage.
Mine dynamics and productivity change
As mentioned in Section 2, the government and the Coal Control Association cut off resources to inefficient coal mines and closed them, with the aim of concentrating production on efficient mines. This means that mine dynamics in this period was related to a key policy issue. To see the scale of mine dynamics and its productivity implications, we need comprehensive minelevel data on production and inputs. For this purpose also, the basic data source is Honpo Kogyo no Susei (Mining Yearbook of Japan), which contains mine-level data on production and numbers of workers for almost all coal mines with an annual production over 10,000 tons. Unfortunately, input data on factors other than workers are not available, so mine-level TFP cannot be measured. Nevertheless, using these data does make it possible to observe mine dynamics and the implications for labour productivity. Using these data, we now examine the entry and exit of coal mines. Table 6 reports entry and exit for three periods: 1930-35, 1935-39, and 1939-44 . First, let us look at the period 1930-35, just before the war, as a benchmark. In 1930, there were 156 coal mines whose annual production was over 10,000 tons. Thirty five of these had exited by 1935. These exiting mines accounted for 22.4 percent of the total in terms of number of mines, but only 6.5 percent in terms of production. During the same period, 76 new mines entered the industry, with a production share of 9.1 percent in 1935. These data imply that despite the frequency of entry and exit, most of these mines were small; hence market structure remained basically stable in this period.
By contrast, the period 1935-39, the early stage of the war, was characterized by accelerations of entry. That is, 144 mines entered the industry and their production share was 14.2 percent. This is attributable to the growth of military demand and the sharp rise in coal prices from the end of 1936 (Figure 2 ). New entries were also encouraged by the price control policy that excluded smaller mines that were not the members of the Coal Mining Association (Sekitan Kogyo Rengokai). On the other hand, exit did not change substantially.
In 1939-44, the landscape changed again substantially. This period, the late stage of the war, was characterized by a surge in exit and a decline in entry. Indeed, 142 mines with a total production share of 14.1 percent, exited, whereas the new entrants had a share of just 7.3 percent in 1944. This reflects the policy of concentrating resources and production on efficient mines and to close inefficient mines, discussed above.
The wartime policy of concentrating production on efficient coal mines was based on the belief that the productivity varied greatly across mines, and this was indeed the case. Table 7 summarizes the basic statistics of each coal mine's labour productivity. For example, in 1939, average labour productivity was 164.0 tons per worker, with a standard deviation was 82.4, which is around half the average, as the coefficient of variation indicates. Also, the maximum and minimum values indicate that the most efficient mine's labour productivity was 33.7 times (626.2/18.6) larger than that of the most inefficient mine. This implies that shifting resources and production from inefficient mines to efficient ones could potentially raise average labour productivity of the coal industry.
To confirm whether this potential productivity effect was realized, Table 8 compares the labour productivity of surviving, exiting and entering mines in each period. Looking at 1935-39, we find that the average labour productivity of exiting mines in 1935 was substantially lower than that of surviving mines, which implies that exit improved total average labour productivity. On the other hand, the average labour productivity of entering mines in 1939 was substantially lower than that of surviving mines in 1935, which implies that new entry reduced total average labour productivity. The condition that the labour productivity of new entrants was lower than that of survivors was common to the prewar period, 1930-35, but differences in labour productivity between the two groups grew in 1935-39. Another channel through which mine dynamics had productivity implications is change in the share of surviving mines. Table 8 classifies surviving mines into two groups, namely the share-up group and the share-down group, to compare their labour productivity. Share-up (share-down) group refers to the group of mines whose share increased (decreased) in each period, and here share is measured by the number of workers. In 1935, the share-up group had much higher average labour productivity than the share-down group, which implies that changes in the share of the surviving mines raised total average labour productivity. Furthermore, the difference between the two groups was substantially larger in 1935 than in 1930. During the late stage of the war, 1939-44, the relative labour productivity for the two groups was similar to that of 1935-39. In summary, during the war, mine dynamics had productivity implications in two ways: whereas exit and share change had a positive impact on the total average labour productivity, entry had a negative impact. The next question, then, concerns the magnitudes of those impacts. To examine this issue, I decompose labour productivity change in each period using the formula of Baily et al. (1992) and Foster et al. (2001) . That is, the change in labour productivity from year t-1 to year t is broken up into the following five components.
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within effect
Where, LP it denotes labour productivity of mine i in year t, and θ it denotes share of mine i in year t in terms of the number of workers. S, X and N refer to the sets of surviving, exiting and entering mines, respectively.
The within effect is the portion of productivity change caused by the labour productivity change of each mine, weighted by the initial share of each mine. The between effect represents the portion of labour productivity change caused by share change, weighted by the initial labour productivity deviation of each mine from the industry average. The covariance effect is the cross term of the above two effects. These three terms relate to the mines that survive from year t-1 to year t. The exit effect represents the portion caused by the labour productivity difference between exiting mines and the industry average in year t-1, while the entry effect represents the portion caused by the difference between the labour productivity of entering mines in year t and the industry average in year t-1. Table 9 reports the results of labour productivity change decomposition using the above formula. As seen in Figure 1 , average labour productivity increased in the early 1930s and then declined until the end of the war. Table 9 indicates that the labour productivity increase in the early 1930s was basically caused by the within effect, namely the labour productivity increase of each mine. In the early stage of the war (1935-39), the within effect became negative. At the same time, it is notable that the negative entry effect had substantial magnitude, and the between effect was positive and not negligible. In the late stage of the war, 1939-44, while the within effect continued to be negative and large, whereas magnitude of the negative entry effect declined and the between effect continued to be positive. 4 -2.0 1935-39 -39.5 -32.4 13.8 -11.1 7.8 -17.5 1940-44 -43.6 -39.4 10.9 -15.9 5.5 -4.8
As mine-level TFP estimates are not available, the results in Table 9 cannot be directly compared with those in Table 5 , but some speculations are possible. Of the five components in Table 9 , the between effect, the exit effect and the entry effects are attributable to the reallocation of resources in a broad sense. If we assume that the total resources for the coal industry are given, these effects are reflected in TFP change within district in Table 5 . It is notable that this assumption nearly held true during the war, because the government allocated resources to each industry according to the Material Mobilization Plan, as mentioned in Section 2. If this is the case, the large negative TFP growth in Table 5 at least partly reflects the large negative entry effect in this period, while the reduction in negative TFP growth in Table 5 reflects a decline of the negative entry effect together with continuation of the positive between effect. Finally, as was shown in Table 9 , within effects accounted for the largest portion of the labour productivity decline during the war. A closer look at the mine-level data can help us gain further understanding of this phenomenon. Table 10 lists the mines with the largest negative within effects for the periods 1935-39 and 1939-44. As seen, most of these mines increased their share in terms of workers, and had much higher labour productivity than the average in Table 7 . The government and the Coal Control Association made great efforts to expand the labour force of efficient mines. However, as the supply of ordinary Japanese workers was restricted, expansion of work force in the coal mining industry mainly depended upon introduction of Korean workers. Indeed, the percentage of Korean workers in the total labour force in the coal mining industry increased to be around 30 percent in the period from 1943 to 1945 (Table 11 ). It is notable that Korean
workers were also concentrated on the efficient mines that were requested to expand production, and the percentage of Korean workers was higher in those mines. For example, for Hokkaido Tanko Kisen Co., one of the largest coal mining firms, the percentage of Korean workers was 53.1 percent at the end of June 1945, 12 when the average percentage in Japan was 31.3 percent, as indicated in Table 11 . On the other hand, it is reported that their efficiency was 60 to 70 percent of ordinary Japanese workers.
13 Deterioration of labour force as well as deterioration of coal beds, mentioned above at the district-level, caused sharp decline in labour productivity, especially in efficient mines. The same situation also explains the large negative covariance effect in this period. This implies that leveling of labour productivity was attributable to the resource reallocation. To illustrate that, Figure 4 depicts the changes in the number of workers and labour productivity for mines in the upper and lower tertiles in terms of labour productivity in 1935. It is clear that workers were concentrated in the upper tertile mines, and the labour productivities of these two groups of mines converged. That labour productivity leveled off is also confirmed by Table 7 , which shows a decline in the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation from 1935 to 1944. 
Concluding remarks
In the 1930s and 1940s, the Japanese coal industry experienced huge fluctuations in production and labour productivity. In this paper, I explored the micro-aspects of labour productivity change in the coal industry during World War II, using district-level and mine-level data compiled from official statistics and the original documents of the Coal Control Association. During this period, the coal industry was characterized by dynamic changes in market structure. That is, a number of mines entered and exited the industry, and the shares of incumbent mines also changed substantially. These mine dynamics had substantial productivity implications. In the early stage of the war, many inefficient mines entered the industry, which lowered average labour productivity considerably. However, the government and the Coal Control Association implemented a policy to concentrate resources and production on efficient mines during the war, which curbed the decline in average labour productivity and TFP. Despite the deteriorating environment, coal production in Japan was maintained fairly well during the war. One of the conditions that made this possible was the policy of resource reallocation.
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In the 1930s and 1940s, the Japanese coal industry experienced huge fluctuations in production and labor productivity. In this paper, I explore the micro-aspects of labour productivity change in the coal industry during World War II using mine-level data, compiled from official statistics and original documents of the Coal Control Association (Sekitan Toseikai). The coal industry in this period was characterized by dynamic changes in market structure: a number of mines entered and exited the industry, and shares of incumbent mines changed substantially. These mine dynamics had significant implications on productivity. In the early stage of the war, many low productivity mines entered the industry which considerably reduced average labor productivity. The government and the Coal Control Association implemented a policy to concentrate resources and production on efficient mines during the war, which curbed the decline in average labor productivity. Despite the deteriorating environment during the war, coal production in Japan was maintained fairly well. One of the factors that made this possible was the policy of resource reallocation. 
